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Summary  findings
Countries in transition have considered membership in  The fact finding process is unneccessarily
the World Trade Organization  (WTO) an important  step  cumbersome and time-consuming.
toward integration  in the international economic system.  *  Technical assistance to applicants in meeting the
After several years of negotiations, five members of the  requirements for WTO accession is not effectively
former Soviet Union (FSU)  - Armenia, the three Baltic  coordinated.
countries, and the Kyrgyz Republic - may become  Addressing the commercial interests of all members
members in 1998. It will probably take longer for Russia,  requires protracted negotiations.
Ukraine, and some others.  Governments seeking accession must coordinate the
It takes four to five years to process applications for  legislative and regulatory changes needed in their foreign
FSU countries - which is close to average for recent  trade regimes, adopt liberal trade policies, and identify
applicants. The five countries expected to accede to the  areas of institutional weakness that require delays in
WTO this year are among the more liberal mernbers of  implementation of WTO provisions and seek agreement
the FSU. 'With those five processed, there will be a  on such delays.
backlog of another 26 applications, most them countries  WTO members, for their part, should expedite the
in transition,  including China and Russia. At the current  process, as universal membership is in everyone's best
rate of processing, it will take five to six years to process  interest. They should:
them - and a decade or more for the 25 or so  * Agree to suitable, time-bound extensions to allow
developing and transition economies that have yet to  acceding governments to address institutional
apply.  weaknesses.
Processing is time-consuming because:  *  Provide coordinatecL  assistance to acceding countries
* Legislative requirements needed for accession are  to strengthen their instituitional capacity.
time-consuming.  - Streamline the fact finding aspects of the accession
*  Candidate countries are weak institutionally and  process and give the WTO secretariat the budgetary
unfamiliar with the economic and legal issues to be  resources it needs to work with applicant governments
addressed.  for this purpose.
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Summary Findings
Countries in transition  have considered  membership  in the World Trade Organization  to be an
important  step in their efforts to integrate  effectively  in the international  economic  system. Almost all,
which were not members,  have applied to accede. For a variety of reasons, the process of WTO
accession has been lengthy, complex and challenging  for all countries, including FSU countries in
transition,  none of which  have becorne  members  yet.  After several  years of discussions  and negotiations
however, it is reasonable to expect that in the course of 1998 five FSU countries, the three Baltic
countries, Armenia  and the Kyrgyz Republic  and perhaps a number  of others will complete  the process
for WTO accession.  The remainder,  including  Russia  and Ukraine  will  probably  take longer.
The amount  of time it is taking to process  the applications  of  FSU countries,  four-five  years, is
not substantially  different from the average for recent applicants  for WTO accession. Indeed, if the
negotiations  for the five countries  are concluded  this year, their applications  would have been processed
more rapidly  than the average. Probably,  the main reason for this is that the five countries  involved  have
the most liberal  trade regimes  among  the FSU countries.
Even if these negotiations  are concluded  successfully  in 1998, the WTO would  be faced with the
processing  of a backlog  of another  26 applicants  for accession.  At the current  pace of processing  it would
take another 5-6 years to work through the existing  backlog of current applicants  for WTO accession,
most of which are countries  in transition,  including  China  and Russia. If one adds to this another  25 or so
governments,  mostly  of least developed  countries  or economies  in transition  which have yet to apply  for
accession, it would  probably  take a decade or more to achieve  the goal of universal  membership  in the
WTO.
The WTO process  of accession  is time consuming  for a number  of reasons:  (a) there are extensive
legislative  requirements  that need to be met prior to accession  and, legislative  processes  are inherently
time consuming; (b) acceding countries have weak institutional  capacities and sometimes  even lack
familiarity  with the economic  and legal issues  that need to be addressed;  (c) WTO members have been
placing greater demands  on acceding  countries  than the disciplines  required from existing  members; (d)
meeting the requirements  for accession  to  the WTO is primarily the responsibility  of the acceding
government;  compared  to the IMF and the World  Bank, the WTO provide  much less technical  assistancein support of accession;  (e) accession  requires  that the specific  commercial  interests  of all members are
addressed,  which  frequently  requires  extensive  and time consuming  negotiations.
Governments  seeking  accession  need first, to establish  a central co-ordination  point to provide
direction  and manage  the multiplicity  of legislative  and regulatory  changes  in their foreign trade regime
that are necessary  for accession.  Second,  they need to adopt liberal  trade policies, because  such policies
will both contribute  to their effective  integration  in the international  economy  and facilitate  WTO entry.
Third, governments  need to identify those areas of the WTO agreements  in which weaknesses  in their
institutional  infrastructure  require  that they delay implementation  of WTO provisions,  and actively  seek to
obtain  agreement  on such  delays  as part of the accession  process.
WT'O members can also take steps to help expedite the accession process. Such steps are
predicated  on the assumption  that it is in the interest  of WTO members for the organization  to achieve
universal  membership  sooner rather than later, as they would also benefit if all countries  adhere by the
rules and provisions  of the WTO.
W1TO  members,  first, need  to consider  the institutional  weaknesses  of acceding governments  and
moderate  demands  for  adherence  to WTO provisions  by agreeing to suitable, time bound extensions  in
meeting  W1'O obligations.  If such extensions  are not provided,  either the negotiations  are stalled or the
acceding  country  ends  up accepting  obligations  which  is in no position  to implement  on a timely  basis.
Second, they need to continue to provide assistance  to developing countries and countries in
transition  which are not members  to strengthen  their institutional  capacities  so that they are better able to
meet the requirements  for WTO accession.
Third, consistent  with preserving WrO as a member driven institution,  they can take steps to
help expedite  the procedural  aspects  of accession.  At the very least, they need to ensure that their own
ministries  are adequately  staffed  so that they are not themselves  responsible  for delaying  accession.  More
importantly,  they should  consider  increasing  very substantially  the budgetary  resources  made available  to
the WTO secretariat  in assisting  acceding  governments  in the preparation  of the original  memorandum  and
in the design  of legislation  and regulations  that would enable  them  to  meet WTO obligations.Such an initiative should aim at cutting significantly  into the time of processing  the existing
backlog  of accession  applications  and those that are likely  to be forthcoming  in the near future, as more
developing  countries  and transition  economies  apply  for accession.  A reasonable  objective  should  be to cut
the processing  time of accessions  to no more than two years, a time frame that is feasible  provided  the
above steps are taken. If it were attained  by all acceding  countries,  it would  enable the WTO to achieve
universal  membership  in the next five years, a worthwhile  objective  for the international  community  to
aspire  to.WTO  MEMBERSHIP  FOR COUNTRIES  IN TRANSITION
I.  Introduction
Countries  in transition  have viewed  membership  in the World Trade Organization,  within  which
the rules for the conduct  of international  trade are set and administered,  as essential  to their full integration
in the international  economy. Accordingly,  in the aftermath  of the collapse  of central  planning  and the
breakup  of the Soviet  Union, most countries  in Central  and Eastern  Europe  (CEE) and the former Soviet
Union (FSU) which were not members  applied to accede  to the GATT and then the WTO.1 Those like
Hungary,  Poland and Romania,  which  had  joined GATT  under special  Protocols,  renegotiated  them in the
early 1990's and  joined the WTO at its establishment. 2 Almost  a decade  later, most countries  in CEE are
WTO members,  but none from the FSU.
The objective  of this paper is to analyze  the WTO accession  process,  with a focus  on the countries
of the FSU. The next section  of the paper summarizes  briefly  the main  benefits  that countries  in transition
can expect  from WTO membership. The third section  discusses  the process  and strategies  for accession  as
well as the main issues that have arisen in the cases of countries  in transition  and the FSU.  The fourth
section  reviews the progress  made on accession  by the various  countries  in the FSU, as well as the causes
for the delays which have been common  in the accession  of most countries. The final section  draws the
main conclusions  from the analysis  and presents a number of recommendations  aimed at facilitating  and
expediting  the process of accession  for all countries,  whether  transition economies  or not, which have
already  applied and for those which  have not.
II.  The Benefits  from Membership
The benefits  from WTO membership  fall in three main categories: (a) strengthening  of domestic
policies and institutions  for the conduct  of international  trade in both goods  and services  which is needed
'The  WTO  was  established  as a successor  organization  to the  GATT  in 1995.  The  only  transition  countries  which
have  not  applied  for  accession  to the  WTO are  Bosnia,  Turkmenistan,  Tajikistan  and  Yugoslavia.
2For a detailed  discussion  of the accession  process  and conditions  regarding  these  three countries,  see
Haus, 1992. Czechoslovakia  was an original GATT member and continued  its membership  despite  the
central  planning  characteristics  of its economy  ( as for that matter did Cuba). Slovenia  became  a member
of WTO in 1995,  while  Croatia and Albania  are currently  applying  to accede  (see below  Table 1).-2 -
before  accession  into  the WTO can be accomplished;  (b) improvements  in the ease and security  of market
access  to major  export markets; (c) access  to a dispute  settlement  mechanism  for trade issues  (Drabek  and
Laird, 1997).
As there were considerable  differences  in the institutional  and policy enviromnent  of countries
emerging  from central  planning,  it is natural  to expect differences  in the opportunities  and challenges  that
WTO membership offers for individual  countries or groups.  For example,  many of the transition
economies  oif Central and Eastern Europe either were already members of the GATT (e.g. Hungary,
Poland) or moved quickly to establish  market oriented policies and institutions. For several of these
countries,  membership  in the European  Union is a real possibility  which  has created  opportunities,  as well
as complications  and challenges  for strengthening  institutions  and streamlining  policies which are not
present  for other  countries. For them issues  of membership  in the EC have been in most recent periods of
3 greater priority than issues related to WTO maembership. The focus of this analysis  however, is on
countries  where the EC option  is not available  in the  near future.
Domestic Policies and Institutions.  lUnder central planning the government controlled trade
through state trade enterprises  and the institutions  governing  other aspects of international  exchange of
goods and services,  such as intellectual  property rights, standards,  phytosanitary  provisions,  procurement
etc. were either different  or non-existent. WTO membership  requires  that these policies and institutions
be  brought in  line with the provisions of ithe main international  agreements administered by  the
Organization  regarding trade in goods (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT), trade in
services (General Agreement for Trade in Services, GATS)  and trade related aspects of intellectual
property  rights (TRIPS). This involves  dramatic  and profound  changes  in the way trade was conducted  by
these countries. Perhaps  most important  of these changes  is the need  to introduce  the laws and institutions
for the operation of private enterprises  and markets free from government  controls and state trading
4 practices. Equally important  is the introduction  of  greater stability in commercial  policy which is a
3See Pietras,  1997.  As we note  in section  IV  however,  for countries  pursuing  both  WTO  and  EU membership
simultaneously,  some  special  problems  arise.
4 During the cold war, the issue of compatibility  of central  planning  with the WTO and GATT was
heavily  influenced  by political  considerations:  Hungary,  Poland  and Romania  were admnitted  to the GATT,
essentially  for foreign  policy reasons  under special  protocols  and despite serious concerns  as to whether
their commitrnents,  for example regarding tariffs, were meaningful  in the context of central planning
(Haus, 1992). At the same time  Czechoslovakia  and Cuba maintained  their original membership in
GATT  although  their central  planning  systems  made their commitments  relatively  meaningless.-3 -
consequence of adherence to WTO rules and legally binding agreements. There is little doubt that
adherence  to the WTO provisions  in these  areas  would improve  efficiency  and productivity  of countries  in
transition  at the same time as it enhances  their integration into the international  trading system  (Drabek,
1996).
WTO membership  also offers the opportunity  for new members to lock in present relatively
liberal trade regimes.  While trade regimes in  transition economies vary considerably, many have
established  regimes  with relatively  low tariffs and not encumbered  by significant  non-tariff  barriers. For
these countries,  membership  provides  the opportunity  to lock in these regimes  by assuming  legally  binding
obligations  regarding  tariff levels  and other  practices. This not only permits  them to enjoy  the benefits  of
liberal  trade but also gives them a first line of defense  against  domestic  protectionist  pressures  that are on
the rise in many countries  and which inevitably  are present  in all market economies.
Market Access.  There are two main dimensions  of market access of importance  to transition
economies: first, is the extension  of permanent  and unconditional  MFN status, that comes with WTO
membership. At present, transition  economies  which are not members  of the WTO have been granted
MFN treatment  voluntarily  by major trading  partners. But there is nothing  that guarantees  that they will
be continued  to be awarded  such treatment. For example,  in the US, extension  of MFN to Russia and
eleven other members of the Commonwealth  of Independent  States  (CIS) is subject to annual renewal,
contingent  on these countries' adherence  to the provisions  of the Jackson-Vanik  amendment  to the 1974
Trade Act regarding  freedom  of emigration.
Second,  WTO membership  could  help terminate  the designation  of some these  countries  as "non-
market economies"  by major trading partners such as the EU and the US.  This designation  is used to
apply different, less transparent and potentially discriminatory  practices in the determination  of anti-
dumping and, in the case of EU safeguard  actions, against imports from a number of these countries,
including  all the CIS members  and China,  (Michalopoulos  and Winters, 1997). It has been a major cause
of trade friction between Russia and the US and the EC.  These practices were fully justified when
practically  all trade was controlled  by state trading enterprises  and prices could not be taken to reflect
"'normal  value". Countries  in transition,  however,  have made great progress  in introducing  market forces-4  -
and eliminating state trading in recent years.  Continuation of the traditional EC and US anti-dumping
practices in the new setting no longer appears justified. 5
The WTO  agreements have no explicit requirement that a member must have  fundamentally a
market  economy.6  Thus,  WTO  membership  would  not  automatically  terminate  the  designation  of
countries in transition as non-market economies. Moreover,  because the anti-dumping provisions of the
GATT accept national legislation and practices to be deciding, it is possible in theory to have the odd
situation  of  countries  becoming  new  members  of  WTO  which  are  still  designated  as  non-market
economies for  anti-dumping purposes.  On the other  hand, the requirement that a  new member  have
fundamentally a market economy is being  imposed defacto by existing members as part of the leverage
they have  in the accession process  (see below section III). It can be reasonably assumed that transition
economies  would  not  secure  WTO  membership unless  they  could demonstrate  that  their  trade  was
fundamentally based on market transactions.  Thus,  in practice, WTO membership undoubtedly  would
tend to create pressure to terminate the non-market designation in national practices of antidumping and
permit all WTO members to be treated the same in major markets.
Dispute Settlement.  Access to an  impartial and binding dispute settlement mechanism whose
decisions have a significant chance of being enforced is a very  important potential benefit for  all small
countries participating in international trade.  Most transition economies are small and heavily dependent
on  international trade.  The dispute settlement mechanism  under  the WTO,  in the short time since its
establishment, has proven to be a major success in providing opportunities for any member, large or small
to get satisfaction on  grievances stemming from practices of other members that cause injury to its trade.
WTO  membership provides  transition economies  with access to this  dispute settlement  mechanism
which can be very valuable to their future trading relationships, especially with large trading partners.
5Michalopoulos  and Winters, 1997.  In late 1997, the EU Commission  announced  proposals  for  liberalization  of
EU policy on this issue vis a  vis Russia and China, which would terminate  their designation  as "non-market"
economies  at the country  level and would  permit  determinations  to be made on a case by case basis, that would  take
into account  the market  conditions  prevailing  in each  commodity  in which  dumping  has  been alleged  (Croft 1997).
6The only explicit provision regarding this matter is GATT Article XVII which calls for notification of
enterprises engaging in state trading practices.  However, Article XVII had never been intended to address
problems ithat  come up when the bulk of external trade was controlled by the state. Indeed the old GATT
accommodated under special protocols several countries, e.g.  Romania and Czechoslovakia which at the
time had centrally planned economies, and Cuba was a member of the GATT and became  a founding
member of the WTO.- 5 -
III.  Accession  Process  and Strategy
The process of accession to the WTO is demanding and has been very lengthy for most countries.
It  can be  divided  into an introductory phase  of formalities and three  substantive phases.  The three
substantive phases  involve:  (a) the  applicant's  preparation  of a  Memorandum on  the  Foreign  Trade
Regime (hereafter referred to as the "Memorandum") describing in detail its policies and institutions that
have  a  bearing  on  the  conduct of  international trade;  (b)  the  members'  fact  finding  phase;  (c) the
negotiation  phase.  The  last  two  phases,  while  conceptually  separate,  in  practice  tend  to  overlap
considerably in time.  Throughout, the applicant is faced with meeting the requirements and provisions of
the WTO and demands from its existing members.  Negotiation is in one direction only: The applicant is
asked  to  demonstrate how  it intends to meet the  existing WTO  provisions;  it can not change them.
Existing members can ask the applicant to reduce the level of protection in its markets; but the reverse is
not usually the case.
The Formalities.  After a country sends a letter to the Director General of the WTO expressing its
desire in acceding to the Organization, the request is considered by  the WTO  General Council,  which
consists of representatives of all members and  which meets frequently during the course of the year.  The
General Council routinely decides to set up a working party (WP) with appropriate terms of reference to
consider the  accession application and  nominates its  chairman 7. Membership of  WP  is  open  to  all
members of the WTO.  In the case of large countries such as China or Russia, a large number of countries
participate, in the case of smaller countries, usually only the "quad" countries, Canada, EC, Japan and the
US, plus Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, a few of the larger trading developing countries as well as
some neighbouring countries which are significant trading partners.  This phase  can be quite short and
would normally take no more time than that needed to translate and distribute the accession request and a
ten day period before the next meeting of the General Council.
The Memorandum.  The first substantive phase, involving the preparation of a Memorandum on
the  Foreign  Trade  Regime by  the  applicant explaining  its policies  and  institutions,  can  be  a  very
'Usually an Ambassador,  permanent  representative  to the WTO of one of its members. Countries  frequently
request  and obtain  observer  status  at the WTO,  which  permits  them  to familiarise  themselves  with  the institution  and
its procedures, prior to a formal  request  for accession.-6 -
demanding  task, because of the range of issues  that the memorandum  has to adclress  and the degree of
detail required.  The issues  include much more than simply  trade in goods and services  -- although  the
latter, which encompasses  the financial  sector, insurance,  telecommunications,  professional  services  etc. is
a large task in and of itself. They range  over various  aspects  of macroeconomic  policy, especially  related
to  foreign exchange management and  controls, investment and competition policy, protection of
intellectual  and other property  rights, as well as enterprise  privatization. The preparation  of this report is
the sole responsibility  of the applicant  -- and so are any delays  in its preparation.
To the extent that the original  Memorandum  is done quickly  but is incomp]Lete  in its details  or the
legislation  and practices  inconsistent  with WTO  provisions,  the more  protracted  is the subsequent  question
and answer period. Sometimes,  members have asked the WTO Secretariat  to review draft Memoranda
before their circulation so as to  prevent incomplete documentation  from being circulated. But the
Secretariat  does not assume  any responsibility  regarding  the contents  of the Memorandum.
Questions  and Answers.  Once the memorandum  has been circulated to the WP members, the
accession  process  enters  the second and, in most cases, the most time consuming  process,  which consists
of members  asking questions  and obtaining  clarifications  on the applicant's  policies  and institutions,  either
based on the memorandum  or on independent  evidence  about  the situation  gathered  by the members. The
first part of the process involves  the initial questions  and answers  regarding  the policies  and institutions
based on the applicant's  Memorandum. This typically  takes  several  months, but in the case of Russia, it
took more than a year (Table 1). The Working  Party typically  does not meet until the Memorandum  and
the initial  questions  and answers  have been distributed. It is followed  by further questions  and answers  of
clarification  which can take several working party meetings sometimes  covering  a period of several
years.
The WTO treaties  contain  very few provisions  regarding  the countries  in transition. The major
exceptions  are that such countries are given more time to implement  GATT provisions regarding the
elimination  of export subsidies  as well as the implementing  legislation  under Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). Thus, the major challenge  faced  by each country  in the process of accession  is
to  enact the laws, develop  the institutions  and apply the policies  that would enable it to conform to the
fundamental  rules and disciplines  of the WTO.  This is a major challenge  for the FSU countries  which
have to make fundamental  changes  in the laws, institutions  and policies  governing  international  trade.-7-
The purpose of the detailed  review  that takes  place during  this phase of accession is to make sure
that the legislation  and institutions  of the applicant  are in conformity  with the provisions  of the WTO.
One of the reasons why  the process is so time consuming  is because  the review  is exhaustive  in its details.
The applicant  is requested  to submit  for the consideration  of the WP members  relevant  legislation  on a
variety of issues  covered  by the WTO which is reviewed  in detail  for its consistency  with the provisions  of
WTO agreements.  Delays  during this phase are frequent:  If a member  feels that the answers  submitted  to
a question or the actions taken to remedy an inconsistency  are inadequate,  it simply resubmits  the
question  for the next round.
While the issues  raised  in each accession  WP vary somewhat  depending  on the country,  there are
some common  themes  that emerge in the discussions  of accession  of countries  in transition  in general and
those of the FSU in particular  that are worth  highlighting.
First, there is a general concern that the laws and regulations  of the acceding  country are in
conformity  with WTO provisions. These  extend  far beyond the obvious  such as the Law on Customs,  the
Tariff schedule  and related  regulations  on imports  and exports. They include  such items as the laws on
joint stock companies,  the Central Bank and credit institutions,  licensing  of economic  activity, domestic
taxation,  regulations  on food and alcoholic  beverages,  veterinary  medicine  and quarantinable  pests, patent
and copyright  protection,  consumer  protection  etc.  Just the listing  of the laws reviewed  by a recent WP
of a small FSU country  ran into  two single  spaced  pages involving  more  than sixty laws and regulations.
Second, within the context of laws and the operations  of government  institutions,  there are two
broad issues  that typically  receive  special attention:  The degree of privatization  in the economy  and the
extent to which government agencies  involved  in the regulation  of economic  activity  do so on the basis
of transparent  rules and criteria as opposed  to administrative  discretion. Both of these concerns  emanate
from the dominant role that the state previously  played in the centrally planned economies of these
countries.
Third, there are issues  that relate  to the jurisdiction  and capacity  of national  agencies  to implement
policies on which commitments  are being  made. The fundamental  concern  is one of governance:  Do the
government  agencies  have the authority  and capacity  to implement  the commitments  that they are making-8 -
in the context of WTO accession regarding the laws and regulations that concern the conduct of
international  trade? A related concern arises about the role and jurisdiction of local authorities and
whether  they have the right and opportunity  to  nullify  the commitments  made by the national  authorities
in the context  of accession  negotiations.
Fourth, countries are frequently  urged to join plurilateral  agreements  such as the Government
Procurement Code  and  the  recently signed agreements on  Telecommunications  and  Information
Technology.
Finally,  there are some issues  that are particular  to countries  of the FSU:  First, is the question  of
the VAT.  Following  independence  most CIS countries  established VAT laws which imposed  the tax on
imports  from the rest of the world, but not on imports  from the rest of the FSU;  such  products  were taxed
at the point  of origin. This is contrary  to international  practice  and all countries  acceding  to the WTO are
being asked to change their laws accordingly. A related  issue that has led to a large amount  of questions
pertains to the free trade arrangements  and custom  union agreements  signed by several CIS countries.
The concern  has been whether  (a) these  agreements  are actually  operative;  (b) whether  they are consistent
with the provisions  of the WTO contained  in Article  XXIV  of the GATT  and Article  V of the GATS.
Negotiations. At some point during the question  and answer phase, after most, but frequently
before  all the points raised  by WP members have  been answered the applicant  is requested  to submit  its,
so called, initial  schedule  of "offers"  in goods  and  services. This consists  of: (a) The detailed  schedule
of tariffs  the applicant  proposes  to impose  on goods  and the level at which  the tariffs  are "bound". This is
the tariff level beyond which a prospective  member can not increase tariffs except in well defined
circumstances  (e.g. following  negotiations  with principally  interested  suppliers  and then, only if it offers
compensation  in the form of liberalization  in other  tariffs, or, as a temporary  safeguard  or in a balance  of
payments emergency); but  a  country's applied tariff can be  lower than its bound level.  (b) The
commitments  it makes to maintain  free access  to its market for services.8 In addition the applicant is
requested  to make commitments  regarding  the level of support  it plans to provide  to its agriculture  relative
to a base reference  period ( usually  the three years before the application  for accession)  as well as other
aspects  of its support  for agricultural  trade (e.g. export  subsidies).
8The  commitments  countries  make  regarding  market  access  on services  are  typically  more  general  and  open  ended
than  in the  sphere  of goods.  For  a discussion  see  Hoekman,  1996.Once these offers are tabled, the accession  process enters its final phase, which involves  specific
bilateral  negotiations  between  the applicant  and  each WTO member  who wishes  to hold them, regarding
the tariff level or the degree  of openness  of the service  sector  proposed  by the prospective  member. The
actual  timing of the original offers varies considerably,  and sometimes  they are tabled very early in the
question  and answer  phase, as e.g. in the case of Georgia. Often  bilateral  negotiations  are taking place in
parallel  with formal meetings  of the WP that continue  to deal with deal questions  and answers  regarding
the foreign trade regime.  The negotiations  phase can also be lengthy, depending on the degree of
openness  the applicant  proposes  and the demands  for market access  made  by members.
When these negotiations  are in the process of being finalized  and the applicant has provided
assurances  that the legislation  and institutions  that would  permit compliance  to the WTO provisions  are in
place, a draft report on accession  is prepared by the Secretariat for consideration  by the WP, which
includes  the schedule  of agreed commitments  on goods  and services. After WP approval,  the report is
forwarded to the General Council. Following  a favourable  decision  by the General Council (usually  a
formality),  the country  is invited  to sign a protocol  of accession.
Strategy  and Tactics. Within  the rules and disciplines  of the WTO, each country  has considerable
scope as to how restrictive  or liberal its trade regime will be.  There are no specific rules as to the
maximum  level at which a country has to bind its tariffs, or how many services it will liberalize;  or
whether  to establish  anti-dumping  legislation  or not;  or how fast it will liberalize  its agricultural  trade.
Countries  thus have a strategic  choice to make during the negotiations  phase:  How liberal their trade
regime will  be, consistent  with the overall  WTO disciplines.
The key decisions  countries  have to make relate  to the level at which countries  bind their tariffs,
the support  they provide to agriculture  and the range of commitments  in the liberalization  of the service
trade.  One strategy  that some countries  have  pursued in their accession  negotiations  is to try liberalize  as
little as minimally  necessary  to ensure accession. According  to this strategy,  since  at accession  applicants
can not negotiate  improvements  in  their own market access, it would be  desirable to try to maintain
significant  levels of  protection,  which they can use as bargaining  chips  to obtain improved  access in
future negotiating  rounds.  In a similar vein, some transition  economies  which have already established
relatively low tariffs and otherwise liberal trade regimes  -- partly because deep devaluations  of the- 10-
exchange  rate at early stages  of transition  provided  protection  to domestic  industry  -- have presented  initial
offers that  propose to  bind tariffs at rates much higher than those currently applied and/or offered  to
make few commitments  in maintaining  their service  sectors  open.
There are significant  dangers to such a strategy,  however. Individual  countries,  especially  small
transition  economies,  have little leverage  in market access  negotiations;  hence the potential  benefits  they
may be able to obtain through such a strategy may be very small.  At the same time, maintaining
protection  through relatively  high tariffs and protected  agriculture  and service sectors, simply  means that
they impose costs to their own economies,  by foregoing  the benefits of a more liberal trade regime,
which, in the first instance  accrue to the country itself.  If, on the other hand, countries  bind tariffs at
levels  higher  than those applied  and assume  few commitments  regarding  agriculture  and services,  both of
which are possible under WTO rules, they are subject  to another risk:  They create the opening for
domestic  interests  to exert political  pressure  for additional  protection  in the future.
A better strategy  for transition  economies  seeking  accession  to the WTO is to bind tariffs at the
usually  low currently  prevailing  levels  (or to agree to reduce and bind tariffs at low levels as part of the
accession  negotiations)  and to agree to a liberal  trade regime in agriculture  and  services--  and for that
matter agree to participate in such agreements  as the government  procurement  code which increases
competition  and transparency  in the operation  of their markets. Such a strategy, in addition  to providing
the countries  with the benefits  of liberal trade, has a number  of other advantages: It would  facilitate  the
negotiation  part of the process of accession;  it would provide governments  political cover against
domestic protectionist  interests which may otherwise succeed in  subverting  an existing liberal trade
regime; and, the legally  binding  WTO commitments  would  make it more difficult  for future  governments
to  reverse the liberalization.  Increased protection to  "safeguard"  against serious injury to  domestic
industry  is permitted  under WTO rules-- but it is supposed  to be decided on the basis of a detailed and
transparent investigation  to demonstrate  injury which is then notified to the WTO and subjected  to the
scrutiny  of other members. This is far more difficult  to do than  for a powerful domestic  industry to
simply  seek government  support  to raise tariffs  beyond  the applied  level but below the higher  bound level-
- which a government  can do almost  without  any constraint.  The point  about WTO is not that it prohibits
protection,  but rather that it permits  it only according  to certain rules; and that obeying  these rules makes
protection  more transparent  as well as more  difficult  to initiate  and spread.- I1  -
It is fair to ask whether  countries  should not maintain  some flexibility  in their  initial offers, as
they are bound to face some demands  to liberalize  by existing  members,  almost  irrespective  of the level of
protection  they initially  propose. While there is merit to this point, it probably  should  not be pushed  too
far. Experience  in recent accession  negotiations  suggests  that countries with initial offers to bind their
tariffs at levels significantly  different  from the applied  level, encounter  serious difficulties  in accession  --
although  the practice  is quite widespread  among  existing  developing  country  members  many of which  also
have not bound  at all large portions of their tariff schedule. When such an initial offer is put on the
table -- as it has a happened  with several FSU countries  as well as other applicants  for accession,  WP
members  basically  refuse to consider  it or enter  negotiations  on that basis. They simply  ask the country  to
submit  a revised  offer with bound  rates closer  to applied  ones  before  serious  negotiations  occur.
In this respect, as well as in several others, for example,  agriculture, standards  or sanitary and
phytosanitary  regulations,  the demands  made for newly acceding  countries  are greater than the disciplines
on  existing members (Drabek and  Laird,  1997).  Thus,  a  strategy of  minimizing liberalization
commitments  at entry is neither  desirable  nor likely to succeed.
At the same  time, countries  need to focus far more their negotiations  on a number  of other issues
in which institutional  weaknesses  make it necessary  that they are given longer periods for introducing
WTO disciplines.  These relate broadly  to aspects  of the operations  of a market economy, where it takes
time to  establish the proper institutional  infrastructure that would enable' them to  discharge their
responsibilities  properly  under the WTO agreements. There are many examples of such areas: The
development of  appropriate legislation and  institutions for  intellectual and other property rights
protection,  the establishment  of a suitable  regulatory  environment  for standards  or phytosanitary  controls,
regulatory aspects of provision of various services etc.  When such weaknesses  are brought out in
negotiations,  members  suggest  that the applicant:  (a) seek to obtain  technical  assistance  (available  from a
variety of bilateral  and multilateral  donors)  and (b) present a detailed  plan regarding  the particular  aspects
of the relevant  WTO provisions  in which weaknesses  exist and how and for what time period it proposes
to remedy them;  rather than simply provide  an extension  for the application  of major sections  of the
WTO agreements,  e.g. regarding  intellectual  property  rights.
It  is politically  difficult  to adopt a liberal trade strategy at accession, especially  when major
trading partners, which are WTO members, take advantage  of opportunities  which are perfectly legal- 12 -
under the WTO to  limit market access  -- for example by maintaining  high levels of protection in
agriculture. 9 Recognizing  the political  difficulties  involved,  there are, nonetheless,  strong arguments  that
suggest  that  those transition economies  that are currently applying  for WTO accession  which adopt a
liberal trade strategy at entry, will maximize the benefits and opportunities  for  integration in  the
international  community  that WTO membership  offers.  Those that do not, may be saddled with a
protective trade regime that inhibits their adjustment  and effective transition to  a  market economy
(Kaminski et. al. 1996, Michalopoulos and Tarr 1996).
IV.  Progress  in Accession
Progress to date.  As of March 1998, there were 31 working parties formally established  to
consider the accession applications  of governments,  prospective members to the WTO.  Of these,
20 involve governments of  transition countries (including China).  In  this  group are  13 of  the
15 FSU countries (all except Tajikistan and  Turkmenistan).  The remaining include a  variety of
governments  mostly  of developing  countries  (Table 1).
Most of the WPs have  been established  some time ago: The oldest  are those of Algeria and China
established  in  1987, i.e. more than ten years ago.  The newest involve Andorra (October, 1997),
Azerbaijan  (July, 1997)  and Laos (February,  1998).  On average, the working parties considering
accession  have been in place for 46 months, i.e. almost  4 years.  If one excludes  from the calculation  the
two oldest, China and Algeria, which can be considered  special cases, and the three newest, which have
not really started  their work, the average  life of existing  working  parties is 43 months. The averages  for
FSU countries  are roughly similar,  with many  working  parties  having  been  established  in 1993-94.
9The situation  regarding  conmmitments  acceding  countries  have to make in agriculture  is complicated
by the fact that many of these countries  did not provide  substantial  support  to agriculture  in their previous
regimes  and the requests that they frequently  face to actually  reduce  their aggregate  measures  of support
relative  to a "representative"  period, usually  the three years prior to the application  for accession,  contain
serious statistical  and economic  pitfalls:  For example,  the three years prior to the accession  application
frequently  coincide  with  the early 1990's  when these countries  were in the midst of hyperinflation  and
their exchange  rates were unstable  and could hardly be viewed  as representing  "equilibrium". Similar
problems arise if the late eighties are used as "representative".  Thus, measures of support for such
reference  base periods calculated  either in national  currencies  or in foreign  exchange  are not especially
meaningful.  Moreover, as during these  periods imost  governments'  policies penalized  agriculture  rather
than "supported"  it, requests  to reduce  the aggregate  measure  of support  may be completely  unwarranted.- 13 -
This simply  means  that if all these  WPs completed  their work  by the end of 1998,  a most unlikely
prospect (see below)  it would have taken on average in excess of four years to complete  a WTO
accession. In practice, it is likely  to take much longer on average:  The four most recent cases of WTO
accession  based on working  parties (Bulgaria,  Equador, Mongolia,  Panama)  took on average 73 months,
i.e a little in excess of six years from the time the working party was established  to the time WTO
membership  entered  into force. If we apply  the same average  to the FSU countries, it means  that WTO
membership  on average for those that applied  in 1993-1994  can not be expected  before 1999; for some, it
may come somewhat  earlier and for some, especially  those that applied  most recently,  it is likely to be
much  later.
Looking  at the specific  situation  regarding  the progress  made in the accession  of FSU countries,
Table 1, shows  the following:
- Two countries,  Tadjikistan  and Turkmenistan  have  not applied  for accession.
- Two countries,  Azerbaijan  and Uzbekistan  are at the very early stages in the process, as
they  have not yet submitted  a Memorandum  of the Foreign  Trade Regime.14
TABLE  1
Timetable  of Accessions  to the WTO
Government  Date of WP Establishment  Date of Circulation of  Date of Circulation of  Supplementary  Negotiations
|  Memorandum  First Q. & A's  Information, Q & A's
Countries in Transition
- Formaer Soviet Union  .
Armenia  December 1993  April 1995  September 1995  x
Azerbaijan  July 1997
Belatus  1.  October 1993  January 1996  January 1997  x
Estonia  March 1994  March 1994  October 1994  xx
Georgia  July 1996  April 1997  September 1997  x  x
Kazakstan  February 1996  September 1996  January 1997  x  x
Kyrgyz Republic  April 1996  August 1996  January 1997  x
Latvia  December 1993  August 1994  February 1995  x
Lithuania  February 1994  December 1994  September 1995  x
Moldova  December 1993  September 1996  May 1997  x  x
Russian  Federation  June 1993  March 1994  June 1995  x  x
Ukraine  December 1993  July 1994  February 1995  x  x
Uzbekistan  December 1994  _
- Other Countries in Transition
Albania  December 1992  January 1995  September 1995  x
Cambodia  December 1994
China  March 1987  February 1987  November 1987  x  x
Croatia  October 1993  June 1994  August 1995  x  x
FYR Macedonia  December 1994
Laos  February 199815
Government  Date of WP Establishment  Date of Circulation of  Date of Circulation of  Supplementary  Negotiations
Memorandum  First Q. & A's  Information, Q & A's
Vietnam  January 1995  October 1996  March 1998
others
Algeria  June 1987  July 1996  July 1997  x
Andorra  October 1997  . _
Nepal  June 1989  February 1990  November 1990
Oman  June 1996  October 1996  March 1997  x
Saudi Arabia  July 1993  July 1994  November 1995  x  x
Seychelles  July 1995  August 1996  January 1997  x
Sudan  October 1994
Chinese Taipei  September 1992  October 1992  March 1993  x  x
Tonga  November 1995
Vanuatu  July 1995  November 1995  May 1996  x  x
x =  Ongoing;  =  Late stages
Source:  WTO- 16 -
One country,  Belarus,  is in the question  and answer  phase, without  serious  negotiations  yet.
Ten countries, Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,  Kazakstan,  the Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are at various phases in the negotiations  process.  Of these
countries,  five, including  the three Baltic  countries,  Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic are at a
late stage  in the negotiations,  with WTO  membership  a possibility  in 1998.
Why does it take so long?  Althought  achieving  WTO membership  for five FSU countries, and
possibly  others, in 1998  --  which for some would  be five  years after the initial  application,  and for others
somewhat  less - would  be a significant  accomplishment,  it could  be reasonably  asked why does the WTO
accession  process  take so long, and are there imeasures  that can be taken by the governments  themselves,
the WTO and its members  to expedite  the process. For example,  by comparisonr,  accession  of the FSU
countries  to the Bretton  Woods institutions  took on average less than a year.  There are of course many
differences  between  these  institutions  and the WTO, which  need to be considered. But to understand  why
it takes so long to accede  to the WTO, one has to look first at the various  phases  of the accession  process
and the reasons  why delays  may occur:
First, there are several  cases  where a government has taken the initial  step to apply  for accession
and have a working party set up, but then does not follow up the accession process by preparing a
memoranduni  on its policies or take subsequent  steps or does so after a long interval. The reasons  may
have  to do either with uncertain  commitment  to follow  through  on the initial  decision,  or because internal
political conflict  has delayed  the process: Included  among  the former are the working  parties on  Nepal
and Uzbekistan,  among  the  latter the working  parties on Albania, Cambodia  and Sudan.  It should be
noted in this context  that in the case of Algeria,  the working  party was set up in 1987, but the goverrnent
did not produce a memorandum  until 1996.  For FSU countries,  the WP for Uzbekistan  was set up in
1994,  but a memorandum  has not been submitted  yet.
Second, there are a few cases where political issues between an applicant and one or more
influential  WTO members  have introduced  delays  in the process: Arguably,  this had been the case in the
past to some extent with the accession  of China ( and that of Chinese  Taipei which is linked to it), and
continues  to be the case  regarding  the accession  of the FYR of Macedonia.- 17 -
Third, even if the above  problems  were not present, the inherent  process of accession  is a time
consuming  one, for a variety of reasons  which can best be analyzed by decomposing  the overall  process
in the various  phases  described  above  and the factors  affecting  each.
The preparation  of the Memorandum  presents serious  difficulties  to governments  which typically
do not have human or material resources  to address  the issues  that have to be discussed  in detail in the
memorandum.  In some cases there is even a lack of familiarity  with the concepts  and legal and economic
issues  involved.  This has been  true both countries  in transition  and many developing  countries. Most have
had to seek assistance  from outside  experts  funded  by bilateral  aid agencies  as well  as from the WTO itself
and the World Bank.  Despite this assistance,  it has taken on average about 10 months to prepare the
initial  Memorandum  (even excluding  the extreme  case of Algeria). Experience  with the FSU countries
suggests  that most have been able to complete  the report in under a year's time, from the date of the WP
establishment,  but in the case  of Belarus  and Moldova  it took more than two years.  In these two cases  it
is unclear whether  the delays were caused  by difficulties  encountered  in preparing  the memorandum  or
by a country decision  to delay  the process  (see Table 1).
The question  and answer process is time consuming, most fundamentally,  because institutional
weaknesses  in applicants  result in long delays for governments  to ascertain  consistency  between  existing
legislation  and regulations  and WTO requirements  as well  as to design  and put in place the amendments  or
new legislation  or regulations needed.  This is compounded  by the range and extent of the legislation
needed, and by the fact that legislative  processes  are inherently  time consuming. At the same time, the
process  of interaction  between  the applicant  and the members  regarding  the facts  is itself  time consuming:
It takes on average  nine months  from the time of circulation  of the Memorandum,  for the first questions
and answers  on it to be distributed.
The subsequent  fact finding process can also be time consuming  stretching in some cases to
several  years.  In part, the problems  here arise again because of weaknesses  in the institutional  capacity
of the applicant. The WTO secretariat  can be of assistance  only in a very limited  way in the accession
process:  The WTO budget  allocates  very limited  resources  to accession  of new members. The five staff
in the WTO Accession  Division (first established  in 1995  -- as the GATT had no explicit secretariat
resources  devoted  to the processing  of new members)  are extremely  thinly stretched  to service even the
procedural needs and  paperwork  generated  by more than twenty  five active  accession  working parties.- 18  -
On the other hand the members  themselves  do not apply large resources  to  the support of the accession
process.' 0 Finally, delays  occur because fact finding  about policies  merges into negotiations  about how
existing  policies  need to be changed  to ensure conformity  with the WTO.
The negotiations  phase is thus partly about existing  policies  pertaining  to various aspects  of the
WTO agreements  and partly about the specific tariff bindings and commitrnents  in agriculture and
services. Delays can occur from both sides: The acceding  government  may be unwilling  to make needed
liberalization  commitments  e.g. by offering  to bind tariffs at levels much higher than presently  applied
ones or members  may be unwilling  to accept  delays  in bringing  the laws  and institutions  of the applicant  in
conformity  with WTO provisions. Sometimes,  as in the case of some of the Baltic  countries,  the delays
have resulted not so much from the accession to  the WTO per  se,  but from  the links between
commitments  related to the WTO, e.g.  in the area of agriculture  or services and the possible future
association  of the countries  with the EC. For example,  Estonia,  with a currently  very liberal  trade regime
in agriculture,  had to review its WTO policy commitments  in that sector, in the light of its interest in
joining the EC and phasing in the latter's more interventionist  agricultural  policy. Both Estonia's and
Latvia's  accession have had  to  come to  grips with EC-US disagreements  over  the  appropriate
commitments  in some of the service  sectors.
A Comparison  with the IMF and World Bank. It might be useful, in concluding  this analysis  to
compare  briefly the WTO accession process  for FSU countries,  or for that matter  for any others, to that
of membership  in the Bretton  Woods  institutions. The speed of accession  of FSU countries  to the Bretton
Woods  institutions  can be explained  by three major  factors:
First, compared  to the WTO, there aire  fewer issues on which proper legislation  and regulations
need to be in place before  membership  in the IBretton  Woods  institutions  can be achieved.  As introduction
and enactment of new legislation  is a time consuming  process, this by itself explains why obtaining
membership  in the WTO is likely to be more time consuming  than membership  in the Bretton Woods
institutions.
10The  EC for example  has six staff assigned  tc,  support  the accession  process  in Brussels;  the US has a similar
number  in Washington  -- to deal with  the accession  issues  arising  in more than twenty  active  working  parties. Many
WTO  members  however,  notably  the EC, the US, and  Switzerland support  the accession  process  through technical
assistance  from their aid programs  (see  below  page I8).- 19 -
Second, there is much less negotiation  about policies at the time of membership  in the Bretton
Woods institutions  and certainly  there is nothing  comparable  to the negotiations  that occur over specific
tariff bindings or commitments  in services in the WTO.  It can be argued that policy conditionality  is
introduced  later after countries  have  become  members  and it is linked  to their access  to IMF drawings  and
World  Bank loans. This is likely  to be only a small  part of the explanation  why membership  negotiations
in the Bretton Woods institutions  were so much more quickly concluded. IMF membership  is actually
very extensively  conditioned  on the establishment  of appropriate  institutional  arrangements  for the conduct
of monetary  and foreign  exchange  policy, suitable  legislation  about  the Central  Bank and its relationship  to
the financial  sector  etc.  World Bank membership  is less extensively  conditioned  both at membership  and
later on as only a small proportion  of its loans (usually  no more than 25%) are actually  conditioned  on
policy performance. A more important  factor  for the delays  associated  with WTO negotiations  is  that the
political economy of international  trade policy is dominated  by  particular commercial  interests in all
countries:  Thus, while at a general  policy level WTO members  might agree that accession  of a country  to
the WTO is of paramount  importance  to their national interest  -- and for some large countries  to the very
operation of the international  trade system  -- accession can not occur until the particular commercial
interests  in all countries  are satisfied;  and that takes  time.
Third, the developed countries, whose governments  play a  decisive role in determining the
budgets of both the Bretton  Woods institutions  and the WTO, ensured  that large incremental resources
were made available  to the Bretton  Woods  institutions  to expedite  membership  of  the countries  emerging
following  the break-up  of the Soviet  Union. For example,  in the summer  of 1991  the World Bank Board
allocated $30 million  for technical co-operation  activities  with the Soviet Union and its then republics;
and an additional about $15 million  were budgeted  later that permitted  the expansion  of the operational
staff working on these countries  from about 20 to 150 in a matter of months.  Most of this staff and
resources were devoted to fact finding and advisory  pre-membership  activities, i.e. helping prepare
analyses of the overall economic  situation  and policies, preparing the first Economic  Memorandum  (
similar to the Memorandum  on the trade regime prepared for the WTO), advising  governments  on the
design of needed legislation  etc. 11 By contrast, while  the WTO budget devoted  to accession  matters has
"iSee  World  Bank,  1995.  Over  the  period  1989-1990  and 1991-1993,  the author  was  part of the  World  Bank
management  team  directing  the  implementation  of pre-membership  activities,  first in Eastern  Europe  and later the
FSU, and led the preparation  of the World  Bank  Economic  Reports  in three countries,  Bulgaria,  Moldova  and
Ukraine.  These  Reports  are analogous  to the  Memorandum  on the  Foreign  Trade  Regime,  but broader  in scope  and
coverage,  and  prepared  by  Bank  staff  rather  than  the  government.- 20 -
been increased,  the burden on preparing  for accession  falls  primarily  on the acceding  countries,  supported
by a number  of usually  uncoordinated  multilateral  and bilateral  assistance  efforts funded  by aid agencies  as
the trade ministries  in all countries  do not have as a mandate  the integration  of other countries in the
international  trade system,  but the protection  of naitional  conmmercial  interests.' 2
UNCTAD,  the World Bank, the EC, Switzerland,  the US as well  the WTO, all have programs to
provide  technical  assistance  on various aspects  the!  accession  process  and especially  in the preparation  of
the initial  country  Memorandum. Anecdotal  evidence  about  these  programs  suggests  a somewhat uneven
performance:  Many countries  report very helpful  contributions  by foreign  consultants  and advisors  in the
preparation  of the Memorandum.  In some cases, however,  it appears  that advice provided by outside
experts has actually slowed the accession  process, because the consultants  suggested and the country
agreed to a "bargaining"  strategy of bindings of tariffs at high levels and limited  offers on services. As
with other kinds of trade related technical  assistance,  the problem does not appear to be  the lack of
financial  resources,  but lack of co-ordination  among  the various  donors  as well  as between  the bilateral  aid
agencies  providing  the assistance and their colleagues in the trade ministries who are negotiating  the
accession.
V.  Conclusions and Recommendations
For  a  variety of  reasons, the process of WTO accession has been lengthy, complex and
challenging  for all countries,  including  FSU countries  in transition. After several  years of discussions  and
negotiations  however, it is reasonable  to expect that in the course of 1998 five FSU countries,  the three
Baltics,  Armenia  and the Kyrgyz Republic  and perhaps a number  of others will complete  the process for
WTO accession. The remainder  will  take longer.
The amount  of time it is taking to process  the applications  of  FSU countries  is not substantially
different  from the average for recent applicants  for WTO accession. Indeed, if the negotiations  for the
five countries  are concluded  this year, their applications  would  have been processed  more rapidly  than the
12There  is anotier  difference  as well:  The  increased  allocations  to assist  in the  preparation  of FSU  countries  for
membership  in the Bretton  Woods  institutions,  did not require  increased  budgetary  appropriations,  but could  be
obtained  through  the  reallocation  of existing  resources,  or in the  case  of the  World  Bank  reallocation  of  profits.-21  -
average. Probably, the main reason for this is that the five countries  involved  have the most liberal  trade
regimes  among  the FSU countries.
Even if these negotiations  are concluded  successfully  in 1998,  the WTO would be faced with the
processing  of a backlog  of another  26 applicants  for accession. At the current  pace of processing  it would
take another 5-6 years to work through the existing  backlog  of applications  for WTO accession.  If one
adds to this another  20 or so goverrnents, mostly  least  developed  countries,  a number  in the Middle  East
and some economies  in transition  which  have yet to apply  for accession, it would  probably  take a decade
or more  to achieve  the goal  of universal  membership  in the WTO.
Recognizing  that the process of WTO accession  is inherently  time consuming  because of the
legislative  requirements  that need to be met and the negotiations  on specific  aspects  of the foreign  trade
regime  that characterize  accession,  there are a number  of steps  that acceding  countries  and WTO members
could take that would  facilitate  and expedite  accession.
Governments  seeking  accession  need first, to establish  a central co-ordination  point to provide
direction  and manage  the multiplicity  of legislative  and regulatory  changes  in their foreign trade regime
that are necessary  for accession. Second, they need to adopt  liberal  trade policies, because  such policies
will both contribute  to their effective  integration  in the international  economy  and facilitate  WTO entry.
Third, governments  need to  focus on and identify those areas of the WTO agreements  in  which
weaknesses  in their institutional  infrastructure  require  that they delay implementation  of WTO provisions.
They should actively  seek to obtain technical  assistance  to help remedy  the situation,  prepare a realistic
plan for implementing  remedial actions,  as well as seek agreement  to obtain suitable delays in the
implementation  of the agreements  as part of the accession  process.
WTO members can also take steps to help expedite  the accession  process.  Such steps are
predicated  on the assumption  that it is in the interest of WTO members  for the organization  to achieve
universal  membership  sooner rather than later, as they would also benefit if all countries adhere by the
rules and provisions  of the WTO.
WTO members,  first, need to consider  the institutional  weaknesses  of acceding governments  and
moderate  demands  for  adherence  to WTO provisions  by agreeing  to suitable,  time bound extensions  in- 22 -
meeting  WTO obligations.  This should  not involve  lowering  the requirements,  but providing  more time to
meet them.1 3 If such extensions  are not provided, either the negotiations  are stalled or the acceding
country  ends  up accepting  obligations  which  it can not implement.
Second, they need to continue to provide assistance  to developing  countries and countries in
transition  which are not members  to strengthen  their institutional  capacities  so that they are better able to
meet the requirements  for WTO accession;  and they need to co-ordinate  this assistance  better. The recent
establishment  of the Integrated  Program of Trade Related  Technical  Assistance  to the Least Developed
Countries ( WTO, 1997) is a welcome initiative  in this regard. But it is important  to recognize that
technical  assistance,  while  potentially  useful, does not by itself  guarantee  institutional  development.
Third, consistent  with preserving WTO as a member driven institution,  they can take steps to
help expedite  the procedural  aspects  of accession. At the very least, they need to ensure that their own
institutions  are adequately  staffed  so that they are not themselves  responsible  for delaying accession. In
addition, they should consider increasing  very substantially  the resources made available to the WTO
secretariat in assisting  acceding  governments  in the preparation  of the original memorandum  and in the
design of legislation  and regulations  that would enable them to  meet WTO obligations. This need not
entail large increases in the WTO secretariat staff.  It can be done by setting up a special trust fund
earmarked  for technical  assistance  in suppolt of accessions,  say of the order of $4- 5 million  for the next
three-five  years. Such an allocation  would  represent  only a small portion  of what some members  already
spend  through their aid programs  to assist  countries  to accede  but would result  in more than doubling  the
resources the WTO itself currently allocates  for accession.' 4 Channelling  more resources through the
WTO would permit the Secretariat  to play a more active role in co-ordinating  the assistance  efforts in
support  of accession  as well as give greater assurance  that the outside  experts  who assist governments  in
the preparation  of the needed documentation  and in the modification  of legislation  and regulations,  do so
in ways that more effectively  meet WTO requirements.
13For a discussion  of the needs for time extensions  for countries  in transition  acceding  to the WTO, see
Drabek, 1996.
1 4A rough calculation  of the orders of magnitude  involved  is as follows:  Assuming  that each staff year
of consultant  work costs $200,000, an additional  annual budget of $1.6  million  for three years, would
result  in an additional  eight staff years of work  on accession  compared  with the five staff years devoted  to
this purpose at present.- 23 -
Such an initiative  should aim at cutting significantly  into the time of processing the existing
backlog of accession  applications  and those that are likely  to be forthcoming  in the near future, as more
developing  countries  and transition  economies  apply for accession. A reasonable  objective  should be to
cut the processing  time of accessions  to no more than two years, a time frame  that is feasible  provided  the
above steps are taken. If it were attained  by all acceding  countries,  it would  enable the WTO to achieve
universal membership  in the next five years, a worthwhile  objective  for the international  community  to
aspire  to.- 24 -
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